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The recent publication of The New Wittgenstein 
signals the arrival of a distinctive ‘therapeutic’ reading of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical enterprise.  As 
announced in its Preface, this collection presents the 
‘nonsense’ of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic work.  The simple, plain nonsense of many 
philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of 
Wittgenstein’s investigations, according to this 
interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks „fail to 
make any claim at all“ (Crary 6).  This view of 
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘nonsense’ as a term of criticism 
begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, 
and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of 
Wittgenstein’s concerns, elevating ‘nonsense’ to a central 
position in his philosophy.  This paper argues that, in at 
least one case of Wittgenstein’s talk of nonsense, this 
„therapeutic reading“ (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety 
of Wittgenstein’s writing.  Indeed, one of the most 
prominent cases of ‘nonsense’ in the later Wittgenstein 
concerns the remark ‘I know I am in pain’.  Though 
Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, 
this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology.  
Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts 
of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the 
relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of 
first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able 
to find what sense a remark such as ‘I know I am in pain’ 
might perhaps have.  ‘I know I am in pain’ may be called 
nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in 
Wittgenstein’s text: as Cavell says, „‘it makes no sense to 
say these things’ (in the way we think it does)“ (Cavell 70).   
Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first 
person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to 
what the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein 
would have us suppose.  Therefore, at least in one case, 
the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong. 
Most directly to pursue this reading of first person 
knowledge in Wittgenstein, a preliminary summary of the 
indeterminacy he finds in psychological judgments may 
help open discussion.  As Wittgenstein turns to examine 
many of the judgments that might typically be considered 
'psychological', he finds indeterminacy saturating the 
weave of the mental they help to comprise.  This 
indeterminacy is reflected in the lack of rules to which we 
take ourselves to be able to appeal in resolving disputes 
over some of these judgments.  Even though we may have 
"evidence" (LWPP II ff.) to enlist in support of our 
'indeterminate' judgments according to Wittgenstein, this 
evidence may fail to settle the question in a decisive 
fashion (e.g., LWPP II 89-90).  So, in my own description 
of my feelings of, say, depression, we do not seem to have 
available evidence that settles whether I am suffering from 
depression.  I "can observe the state of my depression.  In 
that case I am observing what I for instance describe" 
(LWPP II 6):  yet despite being able to describe my 
feelings and even discuss these descriptions, perhaps 
having friends recall what I have recently confessed to 
feeling, pointing out a trace of hesitancy in my current 
report, decisive evidence still is lacking.  As a result, 
suppose someone disagrees with my description of my 
feelings in this case:   
We are playing with elastic, indeed even flexible 
concepts.  But this does not mean that they can be 
deformed at will and without offering resistance, and 
are therefore unusable.  For if trust and distrust [of a 
description of feeling] had no basis in objective reality, 
they would only be of pathological interest.  But why do 
we not use more definite (bestimmtere) concepts in 
place of these vague ones? (LWPP II 24). 
 
Though we may lack decisive evidence in 
assessing my depression, this indeterminacy does not 
make our descriptions entirely arbitrary.  There is still 
correctness and incorrectness of our judgments in these 
contexts of indeterminacy:   
Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the 
genuineness of expressions of feeling?--Even here, 
there are those whose judgment is 'better' and those 
whose judgment is 'worse'.  Correcter prognoses will 
generally issue from the judgments of those with better 
knowledge of mankind....What one acquires here is not 
a technique;  one learns correct judgments.  There are 
also rules, but they do not form a system, and only 
experienced people can apply them right.  Unlike 
calculating rules.  What is most difficult here is to put 
this indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit), correctly and 
unfalsified, into words (PI II 227).  
 
If, as Wittgenstein suggests, we make 
indeterminate, though nevertheless correct, judgments in 
such 'psychological' matters, and we do so without always 
having evidence we take to be decisive, we might wonder 
how commonly the psychological manifests this 
indeterminacy on his view. 
The lack of rules of evidence that we encounter 
with respect to many of our 'psychological' judgments does 
not signal an essentialism about psychology or a mark of 
the  „essentially undecidable character“ (Hacker 138) of 
psychological judgment.  This lack of rules of evidence is 
rather, according to Wittgenstein, the product of an 
openness of our disputes to irresolution, a lack we can see 
in our inability to settle decisively certain disputes based 
on the evidence available to us.  Thus, at least in some 
circumstances of 'psychological' judgment (of "knowing 
what goes on in someone else") and its disputation, there 
is a "lack of exact rules of evidence" (LWPP II 94).  The 
lack of rules of evidence is supposed to be borne out in the 
many imagined situations Wittgenstein has us consider. 
I am for instance convinced that my friend was glad to 
see me.  But now, in philosophizing, I say to myself 
that it could after all be otherwise; maybe he was just 
pretending.  But then I immediately say to myself that, 
even if he himself were to admit this, I wouldn't be at 
all certain that he isn't mistaken in thinking that he 
knows (kennt) himself.  Thus there is an indeterminacy 
in the entire game. 
One could say:  in a game in which the rules are 
indeterminate one cannot know who has won and who 
has lost (LWPP II 86). 
 
If we consider a situation in which we initially are 
convinced of someone's warmth, only to have him admit 
his lack of gladness, we would not necessarily be 
positioned to settle whether he himself is mistaken in his 
'admission'.  If we cannot rely on his manner to settle 




whether he is glad, and if we cannot even rely on the 
admissions or confessions he may have made as to his 
own feelings at the time, then we might wonder what else 
we have to which to appeal in this case, at least, that we 
could use to decide the issue.  This inability to decide the 
issue is redescribed by Wittgenstein as an "indeterminacy" 
in the game of judging his gladness.  In this remark from 
the Last Writings Wittgenstein touches upon a theme that 
reappears throughout the second volume of collected 
manuscripts:  we encounter again and again contexts in 
which our judgments lack determinacy through lacking 
rules of evidence, rules to which we may appeal that settle 
the correctness of a judgment about someone's feelings or 
thoughts.  If there is indeterminacy in an entire game, this 
indeterminacy is only as well established as the 
considerations Wittgenstein adduces while searching for 
"any and all rules of evidence that refer to experiences" 
(LW II 89): on the path to essentialism, Wittgenstein stops 
short. 
Wittgenstein sets out his conception of knowledge 
about (at least a portion of) the 'psychological' in a 
revealing passage that links strong knowing with the 
availability of rules.  While elevating some families of 
knowledge above others, Wittgenstein still preserves talk 
of our less rule-informed judgments as knowing.  The 
differences between these families of knowing appear to 
shape Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. 
Then one can ask:  What is the characteristic of what 
we can really know?  And the answer will be:  One can 
only know where no error is possible, or:  where there 
are clear rules of evidence. 
"I know that he enjoyed seeing me." -- What follows 
from that?  What of importance follows?  Forget that 
you have the right idea of his state of mind!  Can I 
really say that the importance of this truth is that it has 
certain consequences? -- It is pleasant to be with 
someone who is glad to see us, who behaves in such 
and such a way (if one knows a thing or two about this 
behavior from previous occasions). 
So if I know that he is happy, then I feel certain, not 
uncertain, in my pleasure.  And that, one could say, 
isn't knowing (LWPP II 49). 
 
My knowing that someone is glad is legitimately 
knowing, though not knowing of the particular variety 
Wittgenstein mentions at the beginning of this passage.  
No harm is done in claiming I know someone is glad 
provided that I am not taking myself to have rules which 
settle the case when there is a "lack of exact rules of 
evidence" (LWPP II 94).  As Wittgenstein repeats, „If 
someone ‘pretends friendship and then finally shows his 
true feelings, or confesses’, we normally don’t think of 
doubting his confessions in turn, and of also saying that we 
cannot know what’s really (wirklich) going on in him“ 
(LWPP II 86).  There is a sense to knowledge claims in 
psychology on Wittgenstein’s view, only without the 
suggestion of proof we might otherwise expect to be able 
to provide: this is the working of third person psychological 
knowledge according to the later manuscripts. 
Having focused much of his discussion on 
interpersonal psychological judgment, Wittgenstein 
extends his discussion from third- to first-person 
descriptions.  As a beginning for interpretation, 
Wittgenstein reveals quite openly that he is prepared to 
treat first-person talk about feelings as descriptions 
properly understood.  As Hacker suggests, „Describing 
one’s state of mind is indeed something one can do“ 
(Hacker 95).  More properly to familiarize us with the terms 
of this discussion, Wittgenstein attempts some clarification 
of his talk of 'observation' which may help with the 
interpretation of more complex passages.  Observing our 
own feelings, according to Wittgenstein, involves 
positioning ourselves to be receptive to our mood. 
I can observe the state of my depression.  In that case 
I am observing what I for instance describe. 
A thought which one month ago was still unbearable to 
me is no longer so today.  (A touch which was painful 
yesterday is not so today.)  That is the result of an 
observation. ... 
What do we call 'observing'?  Roughly this:  putting 
oneself into the most favorable situation to receive 
certain impressions with the purpose, for instance, of 
describing them (LWPP II 6-7). 
 
As these comments may help make evident, 
Wittgenstein is prepared to speak of observing and 
describing in the first-person case quite openly.  Indeed, 
first-person description is available for a range of 
psychological qualities, including pain, as Wittgenstein 
remarks while considering another example of self-
observation.  „And now I can simplify the case.  He doesn't 
even have to produce the pain on purpose;  rather, let it be 
a constant pain (a headache or a stomache-ache) and let 
him be thinking about how to describe his feeling correctly 
(richtige)“ (LWPP I 614-18). 
Wittgenstein therefore finds in his exploration of 
psychology that first-person psychological descriptions 
may correctly characterize our depression or our pain, and 
not in a manner which clearly admits of definite rules which 
help to settle their correctness.  He has spoken of first-
person knowledge of features of our psychology, albeit in a 
limited and deflated sense of ‘knowledge’ familiar from 
cases of third-person psychological judgment.  As a result 
of his investigations, Wittgenstein has found a way to lend 
sense to first-person knowledge, perhaps even to 
instances in which we might claim ‘I know I am in pain’.  ‘I 
know I am in pain’ was nonsense, yet through his 
treatment of the philosophy of psychology Wittgenstein has 
found what sense such a remark may have. 
In closing, the therapeutic reading advocated in 
The New Wittgenstein regards nonsense as an unwelcome 
presence in philosophical discourse, one that Wittgenstein 
exposes for its failure to „make any claim at all“ (Crary 6).  
In what may be the most renowned case of nonsense from 
Wittgenstein’s later work, however, this reading does not 
account for the subtle treatment of first-person knowledge 
present in the later manuscripts.  Rather than failing to 
make any claim at all, our remarks of first-person 
knowledge are able to have sense, if Wittgenstein’s texts 
are to be believed.  At least in one case, therefore, 
nonsense remarks may yield some sense, and there is an 
irony here.  The therapeutic reading, attributed to Cavell, is 
belied by Cavell’s own early treatment of self-knowledge – 
upon which it is supposed to be based (Crary 7).  In 
Cavell’s own words, first-person knowledge of our 
psychology is not an illusion on Wittgenstein’s developed 
view: „philosophers, I believe, are under the impression 
that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think 
and feel, and even that we can know ourselves.  This 
extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of 
Wittgenstein’s as: ... ‘It cannot be said of me at all (except 
perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain’ (246).  But the 
‘can’ and ‘cannot’ in these remarks are grammatical; they 
mean ‘it makes no sense to say these things’ (in the way 
we think it does). ... The implication is not that I cannot 
know myself, but that knowing oneself ... is not a matter of 
cognizing (classically, ‘intuiting’) mental acts and particular 
sensations“ (Cavell 69-70).  If the argument of this paper 
lends support to Cavell’s early view of knowledge in the 
first-person, then the therapeutic reading in The New 
Wittgenstein may be in need of a firmer rooting in both the 
texts of Wittgenstein and the tradition of their exegesis. 
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